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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-N. L. R. B.-COERCIoN OF EMPLOYEES BY WORDS-
FREEDOM OF SPEEcii-[Federal].-Petitioner, the National Labor Relations
Board, in seeking to have a cease and desist order enforced, asserted that
respondent took measures, in violation of Section 8(1, 2) of the National
Labor Relations Act,1 to compel its employees to join a company union and
not to join a C. I. 0. affiliate. Among the acts by which petitioner asserted
the employer interfered, restrained, and coerced its employees was the dis-
tribution of a pamphlet to each of the employees. This pamphlet was headed
with an American flag and a verse from the "Star-Spangled Banner." It
purported to explain the meaning of the National Labor Relation Act. One
prominent heading was: "None Required to Join Any Organization." Pain
was taken to express the negative aspect of the law, what employees could
not be compelled to do in the way of labor organization, and very little
emphasis was placed upon the positive aspect of what the employees could
do under the law. The union particularly objected to a passage headed
"Harmony and Confidence," reciting that the employees had never had to
strike, that they had always had a fair hearing, that there had always been
an amicable adjustment of all reasonable complaints, and asking the em-
ployees whether they wanted to gamble on strikes and unemployment. A
section headed "Agitators," asserted that no agitator could run a factory,
get orders, or furnish jobs as the company had done for 47 years. Held:
The letter construed in its entirety contained nothing which could be called
a threat or an attempted coercion of the employees, in violation of section
8(1, 2) of the National Labor Relations Act. National Labor Relations
Board v. Gutmann & Co.2
Under the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, free-
dom of speech is guaranteed to all, employer and employee alike. An em-
ployer, therefore, may express his opinion freely on any labor situation.
However, the National Labor Relations Act provides that an employer shall
not interfere with, restrain, or coerce his employees in choosing their repre-
sentatives for collective bargaining.3 Conceivably, interference, restraint,
or coercion could be by means of words alone. The problem is to recon-
cile the employer's constitutional freedom of speech with his obligation to
refrain from the unfair labor practices prohibited by the act. The solution
1. 49 Stat. 449, 452, c. 372, §8; 29 U. S. C. A. §158(1, 2). "It shall
be an unfair, labor practice for an employer-
"(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.
"(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it; Pro-
vided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the
Board pursuant to section 156 of this title, an employer shall not be pro-
hibited from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours
without loss of time or pay."
2. (C. C. A. 7, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 756.
3. See note 1, supra.
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reached by the courts, stated in broad terms, is that an employer, in ex-
pressing his opinion on a labor situation, may not put that expression in
such form as to amount to coercion. The classic generalization of this
limitation on constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech was made by
Justice Holmes in Aikens v. Wisconsin:4 "No conduct has such an absolute
privilege as to justify all possible schemes of which it may be a part. The
most innocent and constitutionally protected of acts or omissions may be
a step in a criminal plot, and if it is a step in a plot, neither its inno-
cence nor the constitution is sufficient to prevent the punishment of the
plot by law." More concretely, the courts have held that if the expression
of opinion by the employer is not itself coercive and if it is not uttered in a
background of coercion, the utterance is under the protection of the first
amendment. 5 One authority has said that the general opinion expressed by
the employer may be even mildly anti-union in character.6 A statement of
an employer in the nature of a threat, however, will not be countenanced, 7
although there may be no other background of coercion; for the establish-
ment of coercion may result from speech alone.8 But isolated statements
of anti-union opinion, in the absence of a policy of discrimination, inter-
ference, restraint, and coercion will not make the employer accountable
under section 8(1).9 Intense or extremely forceful opinion, even in the
absence of a policy of discrimination, and in the absence of the element of
threat, comes under the interdict of the act, for, because of the master and
servant relationship, a strong statement by an employer may carry such
influence that the words may be coercive.10 It has been held that slight
suggestions by the employer may have undue influence among men who
know the consequences of incurring the employer's displeasure.1 In fact,
it has been suggested that anything an employer says with respect to labor
is inherently coercive, because of the economic relationship between him and
the men who hear the statements.' 2
4. (1904) 195 U. S. 194.
5. Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B. (1938) 305 U. S. 197; N. L.
R. B. v. Sands Mfg. Co. (1939) 306 U. S. 332; N. L. R. B. v. Union Pacific
Stages (C. C. A. 9, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 153; Press Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B.
(App. D. C. 1940) 118 F. (2d) 937; Continental Box Co., Inc. v. N. L.
IL B. (C. C. A. 5, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 93; Midland Steel Products Co. v.
N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 6, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 800; Foote Bros. Gear & Machine
Corp. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 7, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 611.
6. Comment (1938) 48 Yale L. J. 54, 72. But see N. L. R. B. v. Ford
(C. C. A. 6, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 905, wherein intensely anti-union statements
were upheld.
7. Virginia Ferry Corp. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 4, 1939) 101 F. (2d)
108.
8. N. L. R. B. v. New Era Die Co. (C. C. A. 3, 1941) 118 F. (2d) 500.
9. Martel Mills Corp. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 4, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 624.
10. Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40 (1937) 300 U. S. 515;
N. L. R. B. v. Falk Corp. (C. C. A. 7, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 383.
11. International Ass'n of Machinists v. N. L. R. B. (1940) 311 U. S.
72.
12. Note, N. L. R. B. and Free Speech (1938) 7 I. J. A. Bul. 25, 36;
Smith, Employers, Unions and Free Speech: View of N. L. R. B. (1938)
2 L I. R. index 707.
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It is settled, however, that statements by employers uttered "in a con-
text of violence"' 3 do not come within the protection of the Constitution. 14
The utterance loses its significance as an appeal to reason, and becomes an
instrument of force. Consequently, there is no longer any reason to lend
the protection of the first amendment.
It is submitted that the court, in the instant case, in construing the
letter in its entirety, completely misconstrued the case. In order to decide
whether or not there has been interference, restraint, or coercion, it is neces-
sary to go behind any particular document and construe all the facts in the
background of the case. The remarks complained of are certainly not so
innocuous that it is inconceivable that they could be coercive in nature, in
the proper background. The background of an anti-union policy did exist
in this case, and the National Labor Relations Board found it easy indeed
to conceive the coerciveness of the expression. This finding of fact, properly
within the province of the board, has been overruled by a narrow construc-
tion of the elements of the case by the court.
M. G.
AGENcy-RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR-AGENT'S NEGLIGENT USE Or PUBLIC
DOOR-[Missouri] .- Defendant's route boy violently entered a revolving
door, which was provided for public use, and crushed the plaintiff, inflicting
serious injuries. The defendant, a credit rating corporation, employed route
boys to deliver reports to its customers, but it furnished them no means of
conveyance. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against the defendant
and recovered. Defendant appealed and assigned as error the trial court's
refusal to sustain its demurrer, on the ground that it was not liable for its
employee's negligent use of the public door. Held: Affirmed;' since it was
necessary to use the door to effectuate the duties of the employment, the
boy was, at the time of the injury, acting in the scope of his employment.
Salmons v. Dun & Bradstreet.2
The general rule of repondeat superior is that a master is responsible
to third persons for injuries occasioned by the negligence or misconduct of
his servants acting within the scope of their employment.' This doctrine
13. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. (1941) 312
U. S. 287.
14. N. L. R. B. v. Link-Belt Co. (1941) 311 U. S. 584; N. L. R. B. v.
Colten (C. C. A. 6, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 179; Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc., v.
N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 7, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 555; N. L. R. B. v. Sunshine
Mining Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1940) 110 F. (2d) 780; N. L. R. B. v. Viking Pump
Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 759; N. L. I. B. v. Elkland Leather
Co. Inc. (C. C. A. 3, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 221; N. L. R. B. v. Reed & Prince
Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 1, 1941) 118 F. (2d) 874.
1. One judge dissented.
2. (Mo. App. 1941) 153 S. W. (2d) 556.
3. Hunter v. First National Bank of Morrilton (1930) 181 Ark. 907, 28
S. W. (2d) 712; Skala v. Lehon (1930) 258 Ill. App. 252, aff'd (1931) 343
Ill. 602, 175 N. E. 832; Hughes v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1931) 211 Iowa
1391, 236 N. W. 8; Funk v. Fulton Iron Works Co. (1925) 311 Mo. 77, 277
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